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In a recent Nature paper, Gabaix et al. [1] presented a testable theory to explain the power law
tail of price fluctuations. The main points of their theory are that volume fluctuations, which have a
power law tail with exponent roughly −1.5, are modulated by the average market impact function,
which describes the response of prices to transactions. They argue that the average market impact
function follows a square root law, which gives power law tails for prices with exponent roughly
−3. We demonstrate that the long-memory nature of order flow invalidates their statistical analysis
of market impact, and present a more careful analysis that properly takes this into account. This
makes it clear that the functional form of the average market impact function varies from market
to market, and in some cases from stock to stock. In fact, for both the London Stock Exchange
and the New York Stock Exchange the average market impact function grows much slower than a
square root law; this implies that the exponent for price fluctuations predicted by modulations of
volume fluctuations is much too big. We find that for LSE stocks traded in the electronic market
the distribution of transaction volumes does not even have a power law tail. This makes it clear
that volume fluctuations do not determine the power law tail of price returns.
Gabaix et al. [1] have recently proposed a testable
theory for the origin of power law tails in price fluctua-
tions. In essence, their proposal is that they are driven
by fluctuations in the volume of transactions, modulated
by a deterministic market impact function. More specifi-
cally, they argue that the distribution of large trade sizes
scales as P (V > x) ∼ x−γ , where V is the volume of the
trade and γ ≈ 3/2. Based on the assumption that agents
are profit optimizers, they argue that the average market
impact function1 is a deterministic function of the form
r = kV β, where r is the the change in the logarithm
of price resulting from a transaction of volume V , k is
a constant, and β = 1/2. This implies that large price
returns r have a power law distribution with exponent
α = γ/β ≈ 3. They argue that their theory is consistent
with the data, even though their hypothesis about mar-
ket impact appears to contradict several other previous
studies [2, 3, 4] in the same markets they study (the New
York and Paris Stock Exchanges).
I. PROBLEMS WITH THE TEST OF GABAIX
ET AL.
Gabaix et al. [1] present statistical evidence that ap-
pears to show that the NYSE and Paris data are consis-
tent with the hypothesis that the average market impact
follows a square root law. In this section we show that
their test may have problems in circumstances (such as
1 One should more properly think of the market impact as a re-
sponse to the order initiating the trade. That is, in every transac-
tion there is a just-arrived order that causes the trade to happen,
and this order tends to alter the best quoted price in the direc-
tion of the trade, e.g. a buy order tends to drive the price up,
and a sell order tends to drive it down.
those of the real data) in which orders have long-memory
properties. This weakens their test, so that it lacks the
power to reject reasonable alternative hypotheses and
may give misleading results.
Their method to test the hypothesis of square root
price impact is to investigate E[r2|V ] over a given time
interval, e.g. 15 minutes, where r is the price shift and
V =
∑M
i=1 Vi is the sum of the volumes of theM transac-
tions occurring in that time interval. They have chosen
to analyze r2 rather than r because of its properties un-
der time aggregation. To see why this might be useful,
assume the return due to each transaction i is of the form
ri = kǫiV
β
i + ui, where u is an IID noise process that is
uncorrelated with Vi, and ǫi is the sign of the transaction.
The squared return for the interval is then of the form
r2 =
M∑
i=1,j=1
(kǫiV
β
i + ui)(kǫjV
β
j + uj) (1)
Under the assumption that Vi, Vj , ǫi, and ǫj are all
uncorrelated, when β = 1/2 it is easy to show that
E[r2|V ] = a+ b V , where a and b are constants.
The problem is that for the real data Vi, Vj , ǫi, and
ǫj are strongly correlated, and indeed, the sequence of
signs ǫi is a long-memory process [5, 6]. To demon-
strate the gravity of this problem, we use real trans-
actions Vi, but introduce an artificial and determinis-
tic market impact function of the form ri = kV
β
i with
β 6= 0.5. We first fix the number of transactions, and then
repeat the same procedure using a fixed time period. We
examine blocks of trades with M transactions, {ǫi, Vi},
i = 1, ...,M , where ǫi = +1 (−1) for buyer (seller) initi-
ated trades and Vi is the volume of the trade in number of
shares. For each trade we create an artificial price return
ri = kǫiV
β
i , where k is a constant. Then for each block
of M trades we compute r =
∑M
i=1 ri = k
∑M
i=1 ǫiV
β
i
and V =
∑M
i=1 Vi. Since we are using the real order
2flow we are incorporating the correct autocorrelation of
the signs ǫi and transaction sizes Vi. Figure 1(a) shows
E[r2|V ] for different values of M and β = 0.3 for the
British stock Vodafone in the period from May 2000 to
December 2002, a series which contains approximately
106 trades. We see that for small values of M the quan-
tity E[r2|V ] follows the artificial market impact func-
tional form E[r2|V ] ∼ V 2β = V 0.6, but when M is large
the relation between E[r2|V ] and V becomes linear. The
value M = 40 is roughly the average number of trades
in a 15 minute interval. We also show error bars com-
puted as specified by Gabaix et al. We cannot reject
the null hypothesis of a linear relation between E[r2|V ]
and V with 95% confidence, even though we have a large
amount of data, and we know by construction that β is
quite different from 1/2. We have also performed tests
on other stocks, which give similar results.
One can ask whether it makes a difference that we used
a fixed number of transactions rather than a fixed time
interval. To test this we repeat the procedure using a
fixed time interval of 15 minutes. Figure 1(b) shows the
result. We see an even clearer linear relation between
E[r2|V ] and V than before, so that the test once again
fails.
Why doesn’t this test work? To gain some understand-
ing of this, we repeat the same test but shuffle the order
of the data, which breaks the correlation structure. As
shown in Figure 1(c), the result in this case is far from
linear even when M = 40, and the test easily shows that
the market impact does not follow a square root law.
Thus, we see that the problem lies in the autocorrelation
structure of the real data.
In conclusion our numerical simulations show that the
linearity test of E[r2|V ] lacks power to test for a square
root market impact with data containing the correlation
structure of real data. In fact, even a deterministic mar-
ket impact like r ∼ V 0.3 is consistent with the relation
E[r2|V ] = a + b V for a sufficiently large number of
trades. Doing this for a fixed time interval rather than
a fixed number of trades time makes this even more evi-
dent. Thus the test of Gabaix et al. provides no evidence
that the average market impact follows a square root law.
II. PLACING ERROR BARS ON THE
AVERAGE MARKET IMPACT
While there have been many previous studies of aver-
age market impact, they have not included the statistical
analysis needed to assign good error bars. In this section
we present results about average market impact at the
level of individual ticks. We show that it does not gen-
erally follow a square root law, and that it varies from
market to market and in some cases from stock to stock
in a substantial and statistically significant way.
Realistic error bars for the average market impact are
difficult to assess due to the fact that volatility is a long-
memory process [7, 8]. That is, its time series has a
FIG. 1: A demonstration that the statistical test of Gabaix
et al. [1] fails due to the strong autocorrelations in real data.
The expected value of the squared price return, E[r2|V ], is
plotted as a function of total transaction size V =
∑M
i=1
Vi,
where Vi is the size of transaction i. Each transaction causes a
simulated market impact of the form ri = kǫiV
β
i , to generate
total return r =
∑M
i=1
ri. The transaction series Vi and ǫi are
from the real data from the electronic market for the British
stock Vodafone, and contain roughly 106 events. The error
bars are the 95% confidence intervals computed following the
procedure specified by Gabaix et al. (a) shows the results
for a fixed number of transactions, with M varying from 2 to
40; the curves are in ascending order of M ; (b) is the same
using a fixed time interval of 15 minutes, with variable M ;
and (c) is the same as (a) with the order of the transactions
randomly shuffled. For (a) and (b) we see straight lines for
large M , indicating that the test is passed, even though by
construction the market impact does not follow the r ∼ V 0.5
hypothesis, whereas for the shuffled data the test quite clearly
shows us that the hypothesis is false.
3slowly decaying power law autocorrelation function that
is asymptotically of the form τ−κ, with κ < 1 so that the
integral is unbounded. This makes error analysis com-
plicated, since data from the distant past have a strong
effect on data in the present. Because volatility is long-
memory, the price returns that fall in a given volume bin
Va, which are by definition all of the same sign, are also
long-memory. This means that the errors in measuring
market impact are much larger than one would expect
from intuition based on an IID hypothesis.
We analyze the market impact only for orders (or por-
tions of orders) that result in immediate transactions. We
call the portion of an order that results in an immediate
transaction an effective market order, and for the remain-
der of the paper Vi represents effective market order size
rather than transaction size. Each order of size Vi gen-
erates a price return ri = log pa − log pb, where pb is the
midpoint price quote just before the order is placed and
pa is the midpoint price quote just after. We analyze buy
and sell orders separately. The electronic (SETS) data
for the LSE has the advantage that the data set contains
a record of orders, and so we can distinguish buy and
sell orders unambiguously, but has the disadvantage that
it omits trades made in the upstairs market2. For the
NYSE data we use the trades and quotes (TAQ) data to
infer orders and their signs using the Lee and Ready algo-
rithm [9]; to identify orders we lump together all trades
with the same timestamp and order code. To estimate
the average market impact we sort the events (Vi, ri)
with the same sign ǫi into bins based on Vi and plot the
average value of Vi for each bin against the average value
of ri, as shown in Figure 2. We choose the bins so that
each bin has roughly the same number of points in it.
To assign error bars for each bin we use the variance
plot method [7]. For each bin we split the events into m
subsamples with n = K/m points, where K is the num-
ber of records in the bin. The subsamples are chosen to
be blocks of values adjacent in time. For each subsam-
ple i we compute the mean µ
(n)
i , i = 1, ...,m. Then we
compute the standard deviation of the µ
(n)
i which we in-
dicate as σ(n). By plotting σ(n) versus n in a log-log plot
we compute the Hurst exponent H by fitting the data
with a power-law function σ(n) = AnH−1. We compute
the error in the mean of the entire sample of K points
by extrapolating the fitted function to the value m = K,
i.e. σ = Aˆ KHˆ−1 where Aˆ and Hˆ are the ordinary least
square estimate of the parameters A and H . Interest-
ingly, for smaller values of Vi we find Hurst exponents
substantially larger than 1/2, whereas for large values of
2 The relative impact on price formation of the upstairs and down-
stairs markets is not clear. On one hand, the upstairs market
contains the largest trades. On the other hand, because these
trades are arranged privately and then printed in the transac-
tion record later, they may not have as large an effect on price
formation.
FIG. 2: Market impact function for buy orders of three stocks
traded in the New York Stock Exchange (blue, dashed) and
three stocks traded in the London Stock Exchange (red, solid).
Orders of similar size Vi are binned together; on the horizontal
axis we show the average volume of the orders in each bin, and
on the vertical axis the average size of the logarithmic price
change for the orders in that bin. In both cases comparison
to the dashed black line in the corner, which has slope 1/2,
makes it clear that the behavior for large volume does not
follow a law of the form ri ∼ V
1/2
i . Error bars are computed
using the variance plot method [7] as described in the text.
Vi the Hurst exponents are much closer to 1/2. When
H > 1/2 the error bars are typically much larger than
standard errors3.
In Figure 2 we show empirical measurements of the
average market impact for the New York Stock Ex-
change and for the London Stock Exchange. We con-
sider three highly capitalized stocks for each exchange,
Lloyds (LLOY), Shell (SHEL) and Vodafone (VOD) for
the LSE, and General Electric (GE), Procter & Gamble
(PG) and AT&T (T) for the NYSE. For LSE stocks we
consider the period May 2000- December 2002, while for
NYSE stocks we consider the time period 1995-1996. The
data for the NYSE are consistent with results reported
earlier without error bars [3], while the LSE market im-
pact data is new. The NYSE data clearly do not follow a
power law across the whole range, consistent with earlier
results in references [2, 3]. While β(Vi) ≈ 0.5 for small
Vi, for larger Vi it appears that β(Vi) < 0.2. As shown
in reference [3], this transition occurs for smaller values
3 Since we choose the bins to have roughly the same number of
points, the difference in Hurst exponent between bins with large
and small V cannot be due to a difference in the mean interval
between samples.
4of Vi for stocks with lower capitalization. Thus, the as-
sumption that β = 0.5 breaks down for high volumes,
precisely where it is necessary in order for the theory of
Gabaix et al. to hold. For the London data the power
law assumption seems more justified across the whole
range, but the exponent is too low; a least squares fit
gives β ≈ 0.26. While we have not attempted to com-
pute error bars for the regression, a visual comparison
with the error bars of the individual bins makes it quite
clear that β = 1/2 is inconsistent with either the London
or the NYSE data. A separate study of eleven LSE stocks
gives β = 0.26 ± 0.02 for buy orders and 0.23± 0.02 for
sell orders [14]; in as yet unpublished work this has been
extended to 50 stocks, with similar results. Our earlier
study for the NYSE was based on 1000 stocks [3]. It is
clear that the average market impact functions are qual-
itatively different for LSE and NYSE stocks, and that
for NYSE stocks the functional form varies with market
capitalization [3].
Even if we abandon the prediction that the average
market impact is a square root law, one might imagine
that we could explain fluctuations in prices in terms of
fluctuations in volume modulated by average market im-
pact of the form ri = kV
β
i . However, if this were true,
for the NYSE the predicted exponent for price fluctua-
tions would be α = γ/β ≈ 1.5/0.25 = 6, which is much
too large to agree with the data. (A typical value [10]
is α ≈ 3). To make matters even worse, the power law
hypothesis for volume or market impact appears to fail
in some other markets. In the Paris Stock Exchange
Bouchaud et al. [4] have suggested that the average
market impact function4 is of the form logVi, yielding
β → 0 in the limit as Vi → ∞. For the London Stock
Exchange the power law hypothesis for average market
impact seems reasonable, but with an exponent signifi-
cantly smaller than 1/2. Moreover, the volume for the
electronic market is not power law distributed, as dis-
cussed in the next section.
Note that we are making all the above statements for
individual orders, whereas many studies have been done
based on aggregated data over a fixed time interval. Ag-
gregating the data in time complicates the discussion,
since the functional form of the market impact generally
depends on the length of the time interval. Hence it is
more meaningful to do the analysis based on individual
transactions.
III. VOLUME DISTRIBUTION
The theory of Gabaix et al. explains the power law of
returns in terms of the power law of volume, so if vol-
4 For the NYSE the logarithmic form for average market impact
is a reasonable approximation for small Vi, but breaks down for
higher Vi
FIG. 3: (a) The probability density of normalized volume
for three typical high volume stocks in the LSE, LLOY (red,
circles), SHEL (blue, squares), and VOD (green, triangles) in
the period May 2000- December 2002, based on data from the
electronic exchange. There are approximately 106 data points
for each stock. (b) 1−P (r), where P (r) is the cumulative den-
sity function of returns induced by the same transactions in
(a). For the normalized volume there is no clear evidence for
power law tails; in contrast for returns this is quite plausible.
Furthermore, the volume distributions are essentially iden-
tical, whereas the return distribution for VOD decays more
steeply than the others.
ume doesn’t have a power law, then returns shouldn’t
either. The existence of a power law tail for volume
seems to vary from market to market. For the NYSE
we confirm the observation of power law tails for volume
reported earlier [11]. However in Figure 3 we show the
distribution of volumes for three stocks in the electronic
market of the LSE. In order to compare different stocks
we normalize the data by dividing by the sample mean
for each stock. All three stocks have strikingly similar
volume distributions; this is true for the roughly twenty
stocks that we have studied. There is no clear evidence
5for power law scaling, even though the power law scaling
of the corresponding return distributions shown in Fig-
ure 3(b) is rather clear. If one attempts to fit lines to
the larger volume range of the curve (roughly 101− 102),
the exponent of the cumulative distribution correspond-
ing to Figure 3(a) is highly uncertain but it is at least
3, which together with the measured values of β would
imply α ≈ 3/0.3 ≈ 10. In contrast, the measured ex-
ponents for Figure 3(b) are roughly 2.2, 2.5, and 4.3 for
SHEL, LLOY, and VOD respectively. It is noteworthy
that VOD has a much larger α than the other stocks,
even though it has essentially the same volume distribu-
tion and a similar volume distribution; if anything from
Figure 2 it’s β is larger than that of the other stocks,
which according to α = γ/β would imply a smaller α.
This provides yet more evidence that the power law tails
of returns are not driven by those of volume.
Note that one of the differences between the NYSE and
the LSE data examined here, which may be the underly-
ing cause of the difference in their distributions, is that
the data from the NYSE includes upstairs market trades,
whereas the LSE data does not.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the conclusions of Gabaix et al.
[1] are suspect for three different reasons: First, their
statistical analysis in claiming the existence of a square
root law for average market impact lacks power to re-
ject alternative hypotheses in the presence of the strong
autocorrelations that are present in real data; Second,
new measurements of the average market impact with
proper error bars show that it does not follow a square
root law; Third, for electronic data the London Stock
Exchange the distribution of volumes does not have a
power law tail, and there are substantial variations be-
tween the return distributions that are not reflected in
variations in volume or average market impact. Thus,
it seems that the distribution of large price fluctuations
cannot be explained as a simple transformation of volume
fluctuations.
This leaves open the question of what really causes the
power law tails of prices. We believe that the correct ex-
planation lies in the extension of theories based on the
stochastic properties of order placement and price forma-
tion [12, 13, 14], which naturally give rise to fluctuations
in the response of prices to orders. Further work is clearly
needed.
Note added in press: In a recent study it has been
shown that large price fluctuations in the NYSE and the
electronic portion of the LSE are driven by fluctuations
in liquidity [15]. That is, if one matches up returns with
the orders that generate them, the conditional distribu-
tion of large returns is essentially independent of order
size. This has been confirmed for the NYSE and Island
by Weber and Rosenow [16]. The idea that the tail of
prices is driven by fluctuations in liquidity rather than
fluctuations in the number of trades was implicitly sug-
gested earlier by results of Plerou et al. [17].
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